All lessons focus on the situation in European Small States involved in this Erasmus+ project. These are, in alphabetical order: Andorra, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, and San Marino.

Country reports for this lesson were presented at the Erasmus+ meeting on 29 May 2020 in Montenegro (virtual format).

... let us see what you already know about the content of this lesson. So we start with a few introductory questions. You will receive answers as the lesson progresses. If you click on the question box the correct answer will appear.

In the following chapters we will go into some aspects of European Small States in more detail. Please note that you will find more details in other lessons.

You can learn more about:

• Quality of democracy
• Social cleavages
• Mobilisation of anti-democratic sentiments
• Corruption and inefficiency
• Populism and extremism
• Democracy and Covid-19

At the end of this lesson, we also offer numerous links which you are welcome to select to deepen your knowledge. There you will also find presentations on all our small states with additional in-depth information regarding this lesson.

There a quite a few measures of democracy quality. However, none of them are uncontested. All of them have their strengths and weaknesses, and lastly, most of them vary by their definition of what factors determine the quality of a democratic system. Moreover, a reality of the European Small States is that they are often not included in those measures. Thus, it is a difficult task to compare the small states' democracy quality in detail. The Freedom House ranking is one of the few democracy barometers that includes all of the nine European small states included in this project (see table below).

Table: Democracy Quality of European Small States
– Freedom House Index FHI (Political Rights/Civil Rights, score 0–100)

Source: https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

The Economist's Democracy Index includes at least six of the nine small states. The table below shows the democracy scores for our nine states in question. As mentioned above, these scores have to be taken with a grain of salt. But, at the very least, they give a rough impression of the democracy quality.

Table: Economist's Democracy Index of European Small States
(Score, worldwide rank in brackets; score 0-10)

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2020.

Almost all of the nine European small states rank rather high, with Montenegro being the only exception. As so often, however, a score does not tell the entire story. Liechtenstein, for example, lost points because of the legal design, and in particular, because of the powers of the hereditary prince. But in practice, the prince is rarely ever making use of them. Cyprus lost a few positions in comparison to 2014 due to the shady practice regarding citizenship acquisition ("golden passports").

Objective measures of democracy quality clearly have certain advantages – one of them being objectivity. But ultimately, what matters most is how the citizens themselves think about the democratic system in their respective country.

In San Marino, there are no studies or surveys measuring citizen's perception of democracy. Participation at general elections is rather low (2019: 55.7%) and even declining. The turnout in referendums, however, is increasing (+12 percentage points from 2008 to 2016), showing an increasing interest in direct legislation topics – an interest that is considerably higher than in neighbouring Italy where participation rates for referendums hover around 30%. But then again, low or middle-of-the-park participation rates can be interpreted in two different ways: Either people are dissatisfied with and alienated from the political system or, to the contrary, they are so overwhelmingly satisfied – therefore they don't see the need to participate.    

In Iceland, participation rates are high (2017: 81.2%). Trust in government and parliament, however, took a significant drop after the collapse of the coalition government in 2017. 66% of the Icelandic citizens stated in the European Value Survey (EVS) that they don't trust the government. And 56% said they have no trust in the parliament. But then again, Iceland is a perennial contender for the title of the happiest nation in the world, currently ranking among the top 5 of the happiest countries in the world. Thus, the discontentment with politics doesn't seem to affect their satisfaction with life in general.   

Table: Voter turnout at last general elections

In Andorra, the satisfaction with the performance of the political system is pretty high. In the European Value Survey the mean satisfaction was 5.78, and thus highest among the four European small states that took part in this survey. Trust in the government (41.5%) isn't that high though, as well as trust in parliament (31.9%), let alone the political parties (20%). 

In Luxembourg, citizens are highly satisfied with the quality of democracy (89%). Trust in the government (73%) and parliament (66%) is also much higher than in the rest of the European Union. Last but not least, the turnout rate is – in comparison to other EU countries – phenomenally high (2018: 89.7%). Whether that is a sign of contentment is hard to say, primarily because voting is compulsory in Luxembourg, with few exceptions like for voters older than 75 years. This may also effect a high voter turnout.   

The highest participation rate in the last general election among our small states was achieved In Malta: 92% of the eligible voters took part at the 2017 early new elections. Indeed, Malta still has the highest turnout rates in the world, although voting is not compulsory. Satisfaction and trust with the political institutions are also fairly high, certainly higher than the respective average value in the EU (see Standard Eurobarometer 90).

Democratic and state institutions are rather mistrusted in Cyprus. 87% of Cypriots say they do not trust political parties, 66% distrust the government and another 63% have little or no trust in parliament. Trust in the army is actually highest among all institutions.

Liechtenstein's participation rates are high (78%), especially if we compare these numbers with politically, culturally and economically similar Switzerland, where the election turnout rarely surpasses 50%. The trust in government, in parliament and the hereditary prince is also high (see data of election and referendum surveys). The trust in government is high, primarily because the government for a long time consisted of a grand coalition, comprising the two largest parties, and thus, covering roughly 80% of all voters.

In Estonia, the confidence in political institutions is rather low, but levels have risen recently from 2008 to 2018 (see European Value Surveys 2008 and 2018). The confidence in government increased slightly as did the confidence in parliament and political parties. However, the institution Estonians put most confidence in is still the army.

Finally, in Montenegro confidence in political institutions is quite low. The mean confidence level in government (2.79) is closer to the negative end of the scale (4=no confidence at all) than to the positive end (1= great deal of confidence). Confidence in parliament and parties is even lower. The army is the institution with the highest confidence levels (see European Values Survey 2008 and 2018). All in all, these numbers correspond with the democracy scores presented earlier. Indeed, there is a connection between objective and subjective democracy measures.  

Political conflict is often determined by the social cleavages that have been and/or still are virulent within a society. Smallness does not by definition exclude the very existence of social cleavages. A point in case is Switzerland – not one of the European small states considered here, but small nevertheless. Despite its smallness, Switzerland has four official languages, two major religions and is geographically highly diverse. Thus, Switzerland experienced basically all social conflicts that are possible. But clearly, the smaller the state, the less likely it is that this state is highly heterogeneous. And indeed, most of the European small states considered here are quite homogenous. 

Liechtenstein is ethnically, religiously, structurally and socially a pretty much homogenous state. Yes, there is a (not so deep) value divide between traditionalists and modernists and a slight economic disparity. But compared to large states with highly virulent social and cultural cleavages, cleavages in Liechtenstein either do not exist or are largely pacified. With some limitations, the same can be said about Luxembourg (albeit there is an increasing gap between foreigners and natives), Andorra, Iceland, Malta, and San Marino. All of these states have no deep historical divides.

The "giants" among the European small states, Montenegro and Estonia, have rather deep cleavages: The most virulent cleavage in Montenegro is the one regarding statehood: A slight majority considers themselves Montenegrin, while a strong minority identifies themselves as Serbs. The level of ethnic support is still rather high, despite efforts to bridge the cleavage at the 2020 elections.

In Estonia, there are three rather dividing social cleavages: between urban and rural regions, between Estonian natives and the Russian-speaking minority, and between conservative and liberal political groups.  

The island of Cyprus is inhabited by a majority of Greek and Turkish speakers (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively). After the military occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey in 1974, most of the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part moved to the southern part of the island, while the Turkish Cypriots moved to the northern part, where Turks from the mainland were also settled. A buffer zone (green line) has been established between the two parts of the island. The division of the island still exists.

In most countries, immigration is a topic that – at least potentially – might cause a mobilisation of anti-democratic sentiment. Corruption is another explosive topic that can lead and, indeed, has led in the past to unrest and protests. In Cyprus and Malta corruption has been a widely discussed topic. National identity is a topic in Estonia and Montenegro, while the European integration is a contested issue in Estonia.

In Liechtenstein, there is rarely a strong mobilisation of anti-democracy sentiment. The status of the Prince (or the monarchy as such) might at times be a highly contested issue, but the fact that such conflicts can be brought to a popular vote in Liechtenstein (with a highly developed direct democratic system), is pacifying these clashes rather sooner than later. European integration, however, is not a contested issue in Liechtenstein. Essentially, all parties support the membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) instead of being a full member of the European Union.

In Iceland, mobilisation of anti-democratic sentiments is practically non-existent. But occasionally there have been outbursts of political protest: In 2008, in the aftermath of the bank collapse, the largest protests in Icelandic history led to the resignation of the government. In 2016, the protest against the government following the release of the Panama papers led to the resignation of the Prime Minister.

Corruption is not a widespread problem in a majority of the European small states. Luxembourg is on place 9 worldwide in the corruption ranking of transparency international, therefore performing very well. Iceland and Estonia rank among the top performers as well. There are no comparable data on Andorra, Liechtenstein and San Marino. But there are indications that corruption at least isn't as bad as to endanger the democratic system. However, the GRECO report – Group of States against Corruption of the Council of Europe – suggests that there is room for improvement in these (and for that matter, in all) countries.

In the three most southern small states, Cyprus, Malta and Montenegro, corruption is seemingly a nuisance or even more than that. All three states rank lower than 40. In Malta, allegations of corruption remain rife. A private bank has had its license revoked recently after money laundering charges. In total, it is estimated that corruption costs taxpayers € 725 million per year, which amounts to 8.65% of the Malta GDP. Actually, the situation got so bad that there were huge protests in November and December 2019.

Table: Transparency International corruption score 2020 (rank in brackets)

Source: www.transparency.org

In Cyprus, the release of the "Al Jazeera Cyprus papers" revealed a great involvement of highest officials in issuing so called "golden passports" (citizenship) for wealthy (and sometimes criminal) foreigners. The release shattered people's trust in the government's anti-corruption measures and willingness to fight it. According to the Eurobarometer survey 2020, 95% of the Cypriots consider corruption to be a widespread problem and 60% feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives.

Montenegro, in turn, suffers from corruption, nepotism and cronyism, which has essentially to do with the fact that one single party has been in power for roughly 30 years. The problem is rather severe, which shows in the fact that it is one of the major obstacles to European integration of Montenegro.

Populism has spread over the world – to what degree, however, depends (also) on the definition of populism. The electoral strength of populist parties in turn heavily depends on opportunity structures, but also on the national party system. As a consequence, in some of the European small states, there has not been an emergence of populist parties, sometimes simply because the party system does not allow or foster the emergence of new parties in general. And even if the statutory framework as such does not exclude new parties from emerging, the current situation within these countries is unfavourable for the emergence of populist parties, or for that matter, any other parties. Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Andorra and, to some degree, also Malta fall into this category. That is not to say that there is no populism and extremism existent in these countries. Rather, these anti-establishment sentiments have not (yet) been organized in the form of parties or influential movements.

In other countries, however, populist parties have gained in strength. In Estonia, the EKRE party, founded in 2011 and building their election campaigns around the question of refugees, is meanwhile part of the Estonian government, driving even the agenda in the coalition government.

Iceland, too, has – to some degree – seen the rise of populist parties (or something like semi-populist). Following the crisis of 2008, a completely renewed leadership took over the country's old agrarian party, the Progressive Party (PP), which was then rapidly transformed in a more populist direction. In the same direction goes the rather recently founded Centre Party (Miðflokkurinn). Extremist parties and movements like the National Front and the Nordic Resistant Movement, however, have a very limited following.    

In Cyprus, there has been a growth of a combination of xenophobic ethno-nationalism and anti-political establishment populism, sometimes blended with calls for more law and order and a more leftist opposition against hedge funds and, as they are called, "loan shark bankers".

In Montenegro, populism seems to be pervasive. Both, government party and opposition parties, use populist rhetoric. There have been strong populistic appeals during the 2020 elections. But then again, and this seems to be one of the problems of populism research in general, eventually one will find populist elements in most, if not all parties' campaigns. The antagonism between a "corrupt elite" and the "pure people" can be found in the rhetoric of right and left wing parties alike, and quite often also in centre parties.  

The Covid pandemic has led to some restrictions of fundamental citizen rights. The right or freedom for (of) assembly and demonstration, for example, has been limited in most countries. How did the pandemic affect democratic institutions? As mentioned above, some rights (like the freedom of assembly) have been suspended for the duration of the lockdown.

In Estonia, there was only modest opposition mainly against the mandatory mask wearing. In Montenegro, COVID-19 opened up room for authoritarian practices like the publishing of names of people in isolation or blocking cities in order to stop Liturgical protest. In Liechtenstein, referendums were postponed without the required parliamentary approval, but the matter was not controversial at all. Luxembourg granted demonstration rights as long as safety rules were respected. The Icelandic population overwhelmingly supported the government's measures during the COVID pandemic. In Cyprus, restrictions have been put on the rights of asylum-seekers and migrants and crossing the green line between both parts of Cyprus (Greek and Turkish) has been impeded.  

As we have seen, the situation in the European small states is very different.  The various instruments for measuring democracy do not provide unequivocal information about which state has the most firmly anchored democracy and where it is best practised. High rates of voter participation can go hand in hand with low levels of trust in political institutions - or vice versa. States are also confronted with internal conflicts to varying degrees; or corruption may be a particular problem in some states; or populist movements and parties are emerging in several states. Just as there is a broad spectrum of democratic and democracy-threatening developments among the large states worldwide, the challenges for the European small states considered here, and how they deal with them vary greatly. Historical experience, neighbourhood to other states, integration in international organisations, geographical location, social conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms, rule of law principles, but also specific events or scandals in individual states can all play a role.

Okay. Then let's see what you could remember from this lesson. Please tick the appropriate answer and you will see whether you are right or wrong.

Liechtenstein
The Principality of Liechtenstein
Government of Liechtenstein
Liechtenstein Tourism/Marketing
Liechtenstein in Figures